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SUEDEEN G. KELLY*

Municipalization of Electricity: The
Allure of Lower Rates for Bright Lights

in Big Cities
Municipalization is the replacement of utility service provided by
an investor-owned utility (IOU) with service provided by the municipality
itself. Today, many municipalities are pondering whether to take over their
local electric IOU. Their goal is to lower electric rates by taking advantage
of changes made in 1992 to federal law that make it easier to procure
cheaper, wholesale electric power.' In the last four years, at least 33 cities
across the United States have seriously considered electric municipalization.2 Of these, six have decided not to municipalize.3 The two cities
of Clyde, Ohio, and Broken Bow, Oklahoma, have completed the municipalization process. Municipalization efforts have usually been encouraged
by the electric ratepayers, particularly large industrial electric consumers,
who are anxious to lower their utility costs.
Cities typically begin the municipalization process with a legal,
economic and engineering feasibility study. Often, implementation of a
munici-palization plan requires pre-approval by the voters through a
referendum. The city must also anticipate that the IOU to be ousted will
fight back with a public education campaign and litigation. Because of the
potentially high costs of municipalizing in the face of stiff opposition from
the incumbent IOU, municipalization may not prove economically feasible
for many cities. However, the mere pursuit of the municipalization option
may bring about enough political pressure to achieve the desired result of
lower, long-term electric rates through state regulatory reform of the electric
industry.
This article describes some of the reasons for the recent increase in
municipalization efforts. In addition, it discusses legal and economic
hurdles that a city must overcome in order to municipalize. Part I of the
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1. See section 211 of the Federal Power Act, as amended by section 721 of the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, 16 U.S.C. § 824j (1994).

2.

EDISON ELECTRIC Iw1

, STATUS REPORT ON ELECTRIC UTILITY MUNICIPAUZATION AND

BYPASS AcrivmEs (June 1996).
3. These include Culver City, California; Dade County, Florida; Evanston, Illinois; Beloit,
Kansas; Westbrook, Norway and Old Orchard Beach, Maine; and Aberdeen, New Jersey. Id.
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article defines municipalization as it broadly applies to various techniques
for accessing lower rates. Part II analyzes two ways in which
municipalization, or attempts at municipalization, can lower rates in areas
with traditionally higher rates. The economic and legal challenges to
municipalization are discussed in Part IlL. Part IVbriefly describes the type
of reaction that one can expect from an IOU facing possible municipalization in one of its service territories. The article concludes that even
though municipalization may be expensive, cities in some areas face rates
that are high enough to make consideration of the option worthwhile.
Indeed, as various regions of the country move toward competition in the
electric industry, those areas not embarking on regulatory reform will face
additional pressures to municipalize so that they too may take advantage
of the lower rates.
I. THE TERM MUNICIPALIZATION COVERS VARIOUS
METHODS FOR ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
AND CONTROLLING DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES
The term "municipalization" describes efforts by cities across the
United States to substitute electric utility service provided by an IOU with
electric service provided by the municipality itself. The city municipalizes
by acquiring ownership and operational control of the facilities necessary
to distribute electricity to its residents. A city can do this in a number of
ways. Traditionally, a city buys or condemns the existing distribution
facilities within the city limits owned by the IOU presently providing
electric service. For example, the city of Las Cruces, New Mexico, is
pursuing the condemnation of El Paso Electric Company's distribution
facilities that are located within the city limits. A city could also build its
own new and redundant electric distribution facilities. This occurred in the
town of Clyde, Ohio,4 and is under consideration in Monroe Township,
New Jersey.5 Recently, cities have been experimenting with becoming a
municipal electric utility by owning less than all the distribution facilities.
Those in the know call this "municipalization lite", or even better, "muni
lite." For example, the cities of Palm Springs, California,6 and Falls Church,

4. Peter Navarro, Electric Utdities: The Argumentfir Radical Deregulation,HARV. BU REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 112; Consumers CreatingCustomer Choice While Regulators, Lawmakers Indecisive,
ENERGY REP., Mar. 11, 1996; Daniel J.Kucera, Can Public Utility Competition Be Overridden by
SanctionedNon-Competitive Behavior?, WATR ENaNERING & MGMT., Aug. 1996, at 15.
5. GPU Seeks Retail Pilot in a N.J. Town that is ConsideringForming aMuni, POWERMARKiS
WK.,Aug. 26, 1996, at 3.
6. PalmSprings, CEI Urge FERCto RethinkOrdersAddressing Definition of"Sham," BCc
UTL. WK.,Sep. 9,1996, at 5.
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Virginia,7 have considered merely installing their own meters at the end of
the IOU's distribution line to each house and business receiving electric
service. The legality of this strategy for purposes of being able to obtain
transmission service to import power, a factor critical to the ultimate goal
of lowering electric rates, is discussed infra.
Whether a city has the authority to acquire, condemn or build
electric distribution facilities depends on local municipal law. However,
since the mass distribution of electricity began in the 1880s, cities have
routinely formed publicly-owned, municipal utilities to provide electric
service. Even so, the state legislature may also have given the state public
utility commission, state finance department, or a related agency a role in
approving the acquisition, condemnation, or substitution of the IOU by the
municipal utility. If so, the municipality may face an uphill battle in getting
approval of a takeover of an IOU's service from the state public utilities
commission which is likely to be concerned about the impact of
municipalization on the financial health of the IOU and its ability to
continue to render quality service to its remaining service areas.9
I.

THE MUNICIPALIZATION MOVEMENT AIMS TO LOWER
ELECTRIC RATES

The impetus behind cities' interest in municipalizing their electric
utility service is the prospect of lowering electric rates. Rates can be lowered
by municipalization efforts in at least two ways. First, by becoming an
electric distribution utility, cities hope to put themselves in a position to buy
wholesale power from newer, lower-cost generation sources, and transmit
it to the municipal distribution facility at a price lower than their IOU
charges. Second, attempts at municipalization may induce efforts by the
IOU or state government to reduce rates. Part (A) of this section discusses
some of the reasons for the substantially higher rates found in many areas
across the country. In addition, it notes the technological advancements that

7. Peter Navarro, ElectricUtilitie: The Argumentfor Radical Deregulation,HARV. Bus. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 112.
8. See, e.g., State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. City of Clyde, 76 Ohio St. 3d 508, 668 NY.E2d
498 (1996) (City of Clyde must seek approval from the Ohio Public Utilities Commission before
taking any action to terminate Toledo Edison's service to facilities that Toledo Edison served
before the effective date of the city's ordinance providing for utility service by the
municipality).
9. See, e.g., Re City of Clyde, 168 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 114, as clarified by, Re City of Clyde,
171 Pub. UtiL Rep. 4th 283 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1996) (Order denying an application by
the City of Clyde for authorization to substitute its municipal electric service for remaining or
minority share of service provided within its corporate limits by an IOU).
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have created cheaper power in recent years. Finally, it describes the legal
changes that have made access to cheaper power available to qualifying
municipal utilities. Part (B) discusses specific instances in which
municipalization attempts have indirectly created lower rates in areas
considering municipalization.
A. Cheaper Power is Becoming Available, Both Technologically and
Legally
Those cities served by IOUs with older generation sources are the
ones most likely to initiate consideration of municipalization. New
generation facilities can be built for roughly three cents per kilowatt-hour
(kwh) on the average, while older generation plant costs twice that.1'
Historic generation costs are high for a number of reasons. First, new
generation facilities are smaller than older ones and more likely to be gasfired plants. Construction costs for older, large coal-fired generation plants
have typically ranged from four to seven cents per kwh over the last ten
years. Even worse, construction costs for nuclear plants have ranged from
nine to fifteen cents per kwh.1 Second, many utilities are saddled with
relatively high-cost contracts with independent generators' known as
"qualifying facilities" (QFs). QFs were created by the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978," which qualified certain types of efficient
independent generators to sell their power to utilities which, in turn, had to
take the power and pay the QFs for their power at the utility's avoided cost
rate. 4 The creation of QFs was an attempt to reduce U.S. dependence on
foreign oil. Today, rates being paid to many QFs are higher than the price
of currently available alternative generation because the cost to produce
electricity when these contracts were entered into was higher than it is

10. See discussion preceding Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Final Rule
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540, 21544 (1996) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. pts. 35 and 385) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 888].
11. Id.
12. Independent generators are entities other than electric utilities that generate electricity,
i.e., they are independent of utilities. For example, a university might have its own electric
power plant that it uses to generate electricity for itself. The university might sell its excess
electricity to the local electric utility.
13. Pub. L No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in 16 U.S.C. §§ 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, and 43
(1994)).
14. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, §§ 210(a)(2) and 210(b)(2), Pub. L. No.
95-617,92 Stat. 3117,3144 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1994)).

Winter 1997]

MUNICIPALIZATION OFELECTRICITY

today."5 Finally, many utilities building new generation during the 1970s
ended up overbuilding, and their rates still reflect added costs necessary to
pay for excess generating capacity. 1
Changes in federal regulation of the electric industry have made
cheaper sources of wholesale generation available to electricity resellers in
two interrelated ways. First, in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct),
Congress authorized persons exclusively in the business of selling electric
energy at wholesale to be exempt from the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 (PUHCA).17 This has created an entirely new market of
wholesale generators of electricity by opening up wholesale generation to
competition."8 The newly created competition led to technological
developments that made power generation much more efficient. Today,
smaller and more efficient gas-fired combined-cycle generation facilities can
produce power at a cost ranging from three to five cents per kwh. Similarly,
circulating fluidized bed combustion boilers, fueled by coal and other
conventional fuels, can produce power at substantially lower costs."
Moreover, improved transmission facilities across the United States and an
increase in coordination transactions" in electricity now permit
consumption of power produced many miles distant.2 ' Second, EPAct
required utilities with transmission lines linking wholesale generators with
legitimate resellers of electricity to transmit their power.' In addition to

15. A typical utility owns numerous generators of varying ages. As discussed above, the
cost of this generation is more likely to be higher than the cost of generation facilities being
built today.
16. After the Arab oil embargo of 1973, consumers responded to higher energy costs by
conserving. In the late 1970s rapid inflation, high interest rates and a national recession also
caused many electricity intensive business to decrease their consumption. Large generation
plants were planned and construction was begun before these decreases took place. The result
was a glut of unneeded generation capacity across the United States. See Richard J.Pierce, Jr.,
The RegulatoryTreatment of Mistakes in Retrospect:Canceled Plantsand Excess Capacity,132 U. Pa.
L Rev. 497,502-03 (1984).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a (1994).
18. By amending PUHCA to exempt electric generators selling exclusively into the
wholesale electricity market from being regulated as electric monopolies, Congress set the stage
for a competitive and unregulated wholesale market to materialize. This new marketplace is
attractive to many investors and entrepreneurs.
19. Supra note 10, FERC Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540,21544 (1996).
20. Coordination transactions are voluntary sales or exchanges of specialized electricity
services, e.g., sale of electricity from temporary excess capacity.
21. Supra note 10, FERC Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540,21544 (1996).
22. Section 211 of the Federal Power Act, as amended by § 721 of EPAct, now provides,
in pertinent part:
Any electric utility, Federal power marketing agency, or any other person
generating electric energy for sale for resale, may apply to the (Federal
Energy Regulatory] Commission for an order under this subsection requiring
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creating and developing a market for wholesale generators, this EPAct
provision created a niche for power marketers that buy and sell power.
What this means for municipal utilities is that they can obtain cheaper
power from distant markets if they qualify as "resellers" under EPAct's
amendment to the Federal Power Act. To qualify, a municipality must buy
power wholesale and use "transmission or distribution facilities that it owns
or controls " ' to deliver the power to the ultimate electric consumers.
These changes have jump started the municipalization movement
and are dictating the form that municipalization of electric service is taking.
Municipalities realize they must qualify as legitimate resellers under the
Federal Power Act to avail themselves of access to cheaper generation over
utility-owned transmission lines. Specifically, in the words of the Federal
Power Act, they must "own or control" distribution facilities and use them
to import cheaper wholesale power to their residents. In this effort they are
usually encouraged by large industrial electricity consumers located within
the municipality. For example, in Clyde, Ohio, the Whirlpool Corporation
strongly supported the municipalization effort, but only after the initial
push toward municipalization had been made by the town. 24 Anchor Glass
Container Corporation initiated the municipalization process when it
encouraged Aberdeen, New Jersey to finance a municipalization feasibility
study.2s Similarly, in the Village of Romeo, Michigan, the Ford Motor
Company funded the preliminary municipalization study.' In other
instances, the industrial customers have, at least initially, been the only
beneficiaries of municipalization. Broken Bow, Oklahoma formed the

a transmitting utility to provide transmission services (including any
enlargement of transmission capacity necessary to provide such services) to
the applicant ....
IThe Commission may issue such order if it finds that such
order meets the requirements of section 824k of this title [section 212 of the
Federal Power Act], and would otherwise be in the public interest ....
16 U.S.C. § 824j(a) (1994). On April 24, 1996, the FERC issued a Final Rule, which became
effective on July 9,1996, requiring all public utilities that own, control or operate facilities used
for transmitting electric energy in interstate commerce to have on file open access nondiscriminatory transmission tariffs that contain minimum terms and conditions of nondiscriminatory service. FERC Order No. 888,61 Fed. Reg. 21540 (1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts.
35 and 385 (1994)).
23. Section 212 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824k(h) (1994).
24. Agis Salpukas, The Rebellion in "Pole City," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,1995, at D1.
25. James S. Lanard & Glenn 0. Steiger, Saying "No" to Municipalization:JCP&L Case Sets
GrassrootsStandard; Winning Union and PoliticalSupport Can ProveCrucial,FORT., Feb. 1,1996
at 29. Anchor subsequently closed its Aberdeen plant after the city's municipalization
referendum was defeated. Anchor pointed to high electric prices as one reason for the dosing
of the plant. Tom Arrandale, ElectricalStorm, GOVa'iG MAG., July 1996, at 20.
26. Peter Navarro, Electric Utilities:The Argumentfor Radical Deregulation,HARv. BUS. REv.,
Jam.-Feb. 1996, at 112.
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Broken Bow Public Works Authority to serve only one large customer, PanPacific Industries.Y Similarly, the city of Darlington, South Carolina is
considering municipalizing and initially serving only five industrial
customers. West Valley City, Utah considered creating a municipal utility
in an industrial park, initially serving only one customer.'
Large industrials are not the only groups supporting municipalization efforts. Other classes of consumers are often demanding that the city
go after cheaper power on their behalf. Power marketers, power brokers
and competitive wholesale generators are also likely to be supportive. For
example, the Modesto Irrigation District of California, which apparently has
authority to distribute electric power within and outside of its boundaries,
hopes to serve large industrial customers in non-adjoining areas with power
supplied to it by Destec Energy, a power marketer." Enova Power
Marketing has been working with the city of Victorville, California in
connection with its interest in creating a municipal electric utility."
B. Municipalization Efforts Spur Other Electric Rate-Lowering
Initiatives
Sometimes municipalization attempts do not have to come to
fruition in order to realize the overarching goal of lower electric rates.
Often, merely a concerted effort by a city or town to consider the feasibility
of municipalization will compel the local IOU to lower rates, either for the
large industrial customer or for the entire town. Either way the town
usually benefits. For example, in Brook Park, Ohio, the community's
attempt to municipalize had stalled over a dispute with the utility until
Ford Motor Company got involved. As a result of Ford's intervention,
Cleveland Electric agreed to price controls which would save Ford $8
million per year over five to seven years. Although the town did not
municipalize, Ford agreed to share its savings with the town. Moreover,
when the settlement period ends, Brook Park will have access to the power

27. Joseph F. Schuler, Jr. & Lori A. Burkhart, Study CallsMuni Trend "Transitional,"FORT.,
July 1, 1996, at 12.

28. Electricity Consumers Empoweefd: Excerpt From a Speech by Electricity ResearchCouncil
Executive DirectorJohn Anderson, AM. MurAL MAM, Mar. 1,1996, at 14.
29. Three Cali.
IrrigationDistrictsloin to Supply Power to PG&E Industrials,ELCRIC UI
WKL, Jun. 3,1996, at 17; In Trying to Take Aucy a PG&E Retail Customer, Modesto, INSIDE F.E.R.C.,
May 6,1996, at 6.
30. Glass Manufacturersin MunicipalizationDeal to Bypass Southern CaldbrniaEd., INDUS.
ENERGY BULL., Feb. 23,1996, at 1.
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distribution system to operate as a municipality.31 In other instances, the
state public utility commission may order rate-discounting by the local IOU.
On a larger scale, the drive to gain access to cheaper power has
been so strong that many states are now considering retail wheeling which
would allow retail competition for generation. California will have retail
wheeling by 2002,32 and several other states have retail wheeling pilot
projects in place. In all, over half the states are actively considering retail
wheeling 4 Several states have considered it and rejected it as an option, at
least for now. A number of bills have been introduced in this Congress to
mandate retail wheeling across the country.'
Certainly, the likelihood that retail wheeling, or significant rate
discounting, will become a local reality will affect a given city's
deliberations on the subject of municipalization. For example, a group of
more than 22 southern California towns has banded together to form the
Southern California Cities Joint Powers Committee to lobby the public
utilities commission and state legislature for competitive electric benefits
rather than pursue establishing their own municipal utilities. However, the
possibility of achieving lower electric rates through alternatives may not
dissuade a city from seriously pursuing municipalization because the very
act of considering a takeover of the local IOU will likely increase the
political pressure in favor of implementing retail wheeling or ratediscounting reform. Victorville, California put its municipalization plan on
hold when Southern California Edison began negotiating electric rates with
a large glass manufacturer, AFG Industries, located within Victorville.
Cities may also view municipalization of electric service as
providing other benefits, such as a better quality of service or freedom from

31. Ron Lietzke, "Municpalizing" of Systems Often Benefits Citizens, THE CoLuMBus
DISPATCH, Aug. 6,1995, at 2G.
32. The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) proposed restructuring of the
electric industry in RE PROPOSED POUCIES GoVERI RESrRUcR1NG CALIORNIAs ELEC. Smv.

IND. REFORMNG REGRATION, 151 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 73,90 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994). The
California Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, an electric restructuring bill in August

1996 that reaffirmed the effort of the CPUC and mandates electric rate cuts for small
commercial and residential customers of 10% by 1998 and another 10% by 2002. See discussion
in California Restructuring, INSIE F.E.R.C., Sept. 30,1996, at 17.
33. See, e.g., RE ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS ADVOCATING TARIFF EQUIrY, 150 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th 409 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n April 11,1994).
34. Kyle Chadwick, Crossed Wires: Federal Preemption of States' Authority Over Retail
Wheeling of Electricity,48 Admin. L.Rev. 191,191 (1996).

35. Id.
36.

See, e.g., H.R. 655, S. B. 687, S.B. 237,105th Cong. (1997).
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state public utility commission oversight. 37 The possibility of ratediscounting or retail wheeling may not dissuade some cities from pursuing
municipalization if they have reasons for municipalizing other than lower
rates. Las Cruces, New Mexico, for example, conducted its municipalization
feasibility study even before EPAct made lower-cost generation most easily
available to municipal utilities. At any rate, the mere possibility, or even the
likelihood, that retail wheeling will be introduced or that the local IOU will
offer rate-discounting will often not stop the municipalization process,
although it is a factor to consider.
III. MUNICIPALIZATION MUST BE ECONOMICALLY AND
LEGALLY FEASIBLE
Cities typically begin consideration of municipalizing the electric
service with a study of the legal, economic and engineering feasibility of one
or more possible means of accomplishing it.' If a municipalization plan
emerges from the study, it may need to be approved by the voters through
a referendum." The outcome of the vote will often be dependent on what
types of savings the residents can hope to receive from municipalizing.
Because the largest cost is most often the cost of acquiring distribution
facilities, either by duplicating the existing facilities or obtaining them
through purchase or condemnation, the plan must first address what
facilities it will obtain.
A.

Possible Forms of Municipalization: Traditional and Muni-Lite

Municipalization can be accomplished by purchasing or
condemning the local IOU's distribution facilities or building new,
duplicative facilities. The feasibility study will focus on precisely what
distribution facilities must be acquired or built. As discussed above, in

37. Numerous states exempt municipal utilities from state rate regulation, at least as to
the rates of city residents. Often municipal utilities are allowed to serve persons residing within
a set mileage beyond the city limits. Because these persons are not constituents of elected city
officials, state law may give them the right to bring any grievances they have about municipal

utility service to the state public utility commission.
38. Companies which have been hired by cities to study the municipalization option
include R.W. Beck & Associates, Strategic Energy, Ltd., and Courtney & Associates.
39. Compare, for example, the result in Aberdeen, New Jersey, whose voters defeated a
municipalization plan in a referendum in 1995, with the result in Las Cruces, New Mexico,
whose voters approved a municipalization plan in a referendum in 1992. James S. Lanard &
Glenn 0. Steiger, Saying "No" to Municipalzation:JCP&L Case Sets Grassroots Standard; Winning

Union and PoliticalSupport Can Prove Crucial,FORT., Feb. 1,1996, at 29; Paul Kemezis, A Tale of
Two Cities,ELEcmCAL WORLD,Nov. 1994, at 52.
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order to be able to obtain open access transmission service over
transmission lines of a hostile utility connecting the generator with the city,
a municipality must "own or control" distribution facilities and use them
"to deliver all" the wholesale power it resells to the ultimate consumers of
the electricity.' The purpose of the provision is to limit wheeling rights to
entities undertaking legitimate wholesale transactions, not retail
transactions masquerading as wholesale transactions. However, the law
remains unclear as to what distribution facilities cities must own or control
to avoid the sham wholesale transaction prohibition."1 Given the high cost
of acquiring electric distribution facilities, many municipalities will be
looking to own or control the least necessary to qualify for wholesale
transmission access.

40. This language comes from section 212 of the Federal Power Act, as amended by the
Energy Policy Act of 1992. This provision provides in full
No [wholesale wheeling] order issued (by FERC] under this chapter shall
be conditioned upon or require the transmission of electric energy:
(1)directly to an ultimate consumer, or
(2) to, or for the benefit of, an entity ifsuch electric energy would be
sold by such entity directly to an ultimate consumer, unless:
(A)such entity is a Federal power marketing agency; the Tennessee Valley
Authority; a State or any political subdivision of a State (or an agency,
authority, or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision); a

corporation or association that has ever received a loan for the purposes of
providing electric service from the Administrator of the Rural Electrification
Administration under the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 [7 U.S.C §901 et
seq.); a person having an obligation arising under State or local law (exclusive
of an obligation arising solely from a contract entered into by such person) to
provide electric service to the public; or any corporation or association which
is wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by any one or more of the foregoing;
and
(B)such entity was providing electric service to such ultimate consumer
on October 24, 1992, or would utilize transmission or distribution facilities
that it owns or controls to deliver all such electric energy to such electric
consumer.
Nothing in this subsection shall affect any authority of any State or local
government under State law concerning the transmission of electric energy
directly to an ultimate consumer.

16 US.C. § 824k(h) (1994).
41. The "sham wholesale transaction prohibition" refers to section 212 of the Federal
Power Act which prohibits retail customers from gaining access to cheaper wholesale electric
power by owning less than all of the distribution or transmission facilities.
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A number of IOU's have filed complaints with FERC' against
municipalities whose municipalization efforts involve acquisition of less
than all the distribution facilities. The IOUs argue that these are sham
wholesale transactions. In the first and only one of these cases yet to be
decided by FERC, FERC has agreed with the IOU. In City of Palm Springs,
California, 76 FERC para. 61,127 (1996), FERC ruled that Palm Springs
owned or controlled insufficient distribution facilities to save it from falling
into the sham wholesale transaction category. Palm Springs had purchased
electric meters and installed them between the end of the distribution lines
owned by the IOU currently serving city residents, Southern California
Edison Company, and the main circuit breaker of each electric consumer in
the city. These meters measured the flow of power, duplicating meters
already installed by Southern California Edison. In deciding the case, FERC
acknowledged that meters may be classified as part of distribution facilities
for cost classification and jurisdictional purposes but found that, because
meters do not accomplish the physical delivery of power, they do not meet
the "delivery of power" requirement of section 212 of the Federal Power
Act. FERC added that to find otherwise would be inconsistent with the
purpose of the statute, which is to prohibit a wholesale sale that is merely
"a subterfuge intended to circumvent the ban on the Commission's ability
to order retail wheeling."" However, FERC specifically declined to discuss
what would be the minimum distribution facilities needed to be owned or
controlled by an entity in order to survive a sham wholesale transaction
challenge.' Therefore, a city considering municipalization must consider
how much of the distribution facilities it must purchase, condemn or
construct, balancing the cost against the possibility that FERC might not
authorize the municipality, as a wholesale purchaser under Section 212 of
the Federal Power Act, to access lower rates.
B. Legal Authority to Undertake Municipalization
A legal review of the feasibility of municipalization begins with an
assessment of the municipality's authority under state law to purchase or
condemn, own, and operate an electric utility. Often the state provisions can

42. See, e.g., City of Palm Springs, 76 FERC para. 61,127 (1996); People's Electric
Cooperative, 60 FERC para. 63,004 (1992); Suffolk County Electrical Agency, 77 FERC para.
61,355 (1996); Cleveland Pub. Power of the City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Cleveland Electric
luminating Co., 76 FERC pan. 61,115 (1996); American Mun. Power-Ohio, Inc. v. Ohio Edison
Co., 74 FERC para. 61,086 (1996).
43. City of Palm Springs, California, 76 FERC para. 61,127 at 61,702 (1996).
44. City of Palm Springs, California, 76 FERC para. 61,127 at 61,702 (1996).
45. City of Palm Springs, California, 76 FERC para. 61,127 at 61,702, n. 10 (1996).
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provide express authorization for purchase or condemnation of utility
facilities. Other times, however, the law is not so clear. In such cases, the
city must either seek clarification of the law or lobby the legislature to
clarify the city's rights under the statutes by providing for express
authorization. Other legal issues include the legal status and effect of the
current IOU's franchise with the city as well as any other relevant contracts
it might have with the city. Typically, an IOU serving a municipality has a
franchise agreement with the city that entitles the IOU to use city streets and
rights of way to operate and maintain the IOU's distribution and
transmission facilities located within city limits." The franchise agreement
is most often not a franchise to serve the residents of the city with electricity;
rather, the right to serve particular areas or customers is usually granted an
IOU by the state public utility commission. Sometimes an IOU enters into
a contract with a municipality to provide electricity and specialized electric
services at specific rates to city offices and public improvements (street
lights, for example).
The legal review would also address the municipality's authority
to: (1) finance the purchase, construction or condemnation of an electric
utility; (2) enter into wholesale power supply agreements; (3) enter into
wholesale transmission agreements; and (4) obtain, if necessary, a wholesale
wheeling order from FERC, as described above.
C. Economic Feasibility of Municipalization
The economic feasibility study weighs the anticipated costs of
munici-palization against the anticipated benefits. Costs can be assessed
across the time line of municipalization, i.e., for the' study of
municipalization, the im-plementation of the plan and the operation of the
resulting municipal utility. Costs connected with the feasibility study
include primarily the costs of services to complete the review, including, for
example, legal, planning, economic, engineering, accounting, and public
relations/education costs. Public relations might seem like an unlikely cost
to have on the study list, but it can be an expenditure of great magnitude
particularly if the proposal will ultimately be voted upon by city residents
or is likely to be opposed by the incumbent IOU.
Costs of implementing a municipalization plan include the usual
costs associated with the start-up of any business: costs of services to form

46. Usually these types of franchise agreements run for a term of years and are routinely
extended by the municipality. However, in the last four years or so, numerous municipalities,
foreseeing the possibility of establishing a municipal utility in the future, have refused to
extend them. Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Evanston, Illinois, are two of these cities.
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the entity, negotiate contracts, obtain financing, purchase (or engineer and
construct) its plant and equipment and hire employees. Implementation
costs would also include those associated with any public referendum on
the plan and with litigating any challenges to the plan. Litigation costs
should not be underestimated, particularly if the resident IOU opposes the
municipalization.
Costs of operating a municipal electric utility include the usual
costs associated with the operation of any electric utility that buys power on
the wholesale market, wheels it over transmission lines and distributes it to
the ultimate electric consumers. Additionally, two other operational costs
might be incurred by a city forming a municipal electric utility today: (1)
costs associated with any loss accruing to the IOU that served the city prior
to municipalization (i.e., "stranded costs" of the IOU resulting from the
muni-cipalization), and (2) costs associated with any loss accruing to the
municipal utility itself from the implementation of retail electric competition
in the future (i.e., "stranded costs" resulting from future retail wheeling).
A municipal utility could be held accountable for the recovery of
stranded costs incurred by the previously-serving IOU as a result of the
municipalization.47 If the new municipal utility uses the transmission line
of the previously-serving IOU" to reach a new generation source, FERC
permits the IOU to recover its stranded costs from the municipal utility.49
FERC reasons that where an IOU has prudently incurred costs that would
not be stranded but for mandatory wholesale wheeling over its transmission
line under the new statutory and regulatory requirements, the retail-turnedwholesale customer (i.e., new municipal utility) should be responsible for
recovery of these costs.' The IOU can recover costs that it demonstrates it

47. Under FERC Order 888, supra note 10,municipalities will be required to pay stranded
costs to the present electricity provider.
48. Pursuant to an open access tariff or order issued by FERC in the implementation of the
wholesale wheeling requirement of section 211 of the Federal Power Act, as discussed above.
49. 18 C.F.R. § 35.26(c)(1) provides:
A public utility or transmitting utility will be allowed to seek recovery of
wholesale stranded costs only as follows:
(vii) If a retail customer becomes a legitimate wholesale transmission
customer of a public utility or transmitting utility, e.g., through
municipalization, and costs are stranded as a result of the retail-turnedwholesale customers access to wholesale transmission, the utility may seek
recovery of such costs through FPA sections 205-206 or sections 211-212 rates
for wholesale transmission services to that customer.
50. See discussion in FERC Order No. 888, supra note 10, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540,21646 (1996).
Note that if the municipal utility uses the transmission line of another utility to reach a new
generation source, or self-generates, any stranded costs of the previously-serving IOU would
not be recoverable from the municipality under FERC's rules. Id. at n. 718. FERC reasons that
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incurred based on a reasonable expectation that the municipal utility's
customers would have continued as its customers. The costs to be recovered
are calculated on a "revenues lost to the IOU" approach. Specifically, the
IOU takes the revenues that the customers would have paid and subtracts
the competitive market value of the power the customers would have
purchased."' Once an amount is identified, the IOU and departing
customers are encouraged to negotiate method and term of payment.
Possibilities include lump-sum payment, amortization over time, or a
surcharge on the customers' transmission rate. 2 The departing customer
also has the option of marketing or brokering all or some of the capacity and
energy associated with any stranded costs claimed by the IOU.s
FERC rules implementing this stranded cost recovery do permit a
customer contemplating departure from its IOU's service to request and
obtain from the IOU within 30 days its estimate of the departing customer's
stranded cost obligation. 4 If the customer disagrees with the estimate, it has
30 days to explain why.
Any city considering municipalization today must also take into
account the likelihood that state or federal regulatory reform will mandate
retail wheeling sometime in the not-too-distant future. The city should
factor into its cost assessment any risk that retail wheeling will cause it to
incur stranded costs.ss These costs, whether they are ultimately recoverable

these costs would not be stranded as a result of the new open access and therefore are outside
the scope of FERC's open access rules.
51. The departing customer(s)' expected revenue would be determined by averaging the
annual revenues received from the customer(s) over the three years prior to the customer(s)'
departure less the average transmission-related and distribution system-related revenues that
the IOU would have recovered from the departing customer(s) over the same three years under
its new wholesale transmission tariff. 61 Fed. Reg. 21540,21658 (1996). The competitive market
value estimate would be determined in one of two ways, at the customer(s)' option. The IOU
can estimate the average annual revenues over the period of time the IOU could have
reasonably expected to continue to serve the departing customer(s) that it can receive by selling
the released capacity and associated energy, based on a market analysis performed by the
utility. Or, the IOU can use the average annual cost to the customer(s) of replacement capacity
and associated energy, based on the customer's contractual commitment with its new
supplier(s). Id. However, the resulting stranded cost obligation can be no greater than the
average annual contribution to fixed power supply costs that would have been made by the
departing customer(s) had it remained a customer. Id.See also 18 C.F.R. § 35.26(c)(2)(iii).
52. 61 Fed. Reg. 21540,21658 (1996).
53. 18 CF.R. § 35.26(c)(5).
54. 18 C.F.I.§ 35.26(c)(4).
55. For example, under California's new electric utility reform, municipal utilities are
prohibited from providing retail service to any customer who is being served (or was being
served as of Dec. 20,1995) by another utility unless the customer pays for any stranded costs
incurred by its leaving that utility. CAL. PUB. UTiL. CODE §
9601(West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
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from customers departing the municipal utility or not, will lessen
anticipated overall benefits of municipalization 56
The primary benefit of municipalization lies in the prospect that the
municipal utility's long-term costs of serving its residents will be less than
those of the currently-serving IOU. As the previous discussion reveals, the
savings is most likely to arise from the munis ability to procure significantly
cheaper generation sources without also incurring a significant stranded
cost obligation to the ousted IOU. Obviously, the probability that this
outcome can be achieved will vary from case to case. But FERC's assessment
that significant benefits ($3.8 billion to $5.4 billion per year of cost savings)
will accrue from wholesale electric competition on a nationwide basis is
encouraging to many cities thinking about municipalization."
IV. THE RESIDENT IOU WILL FIGHT BACK
Cities considering municipalization must be prepared for the
likelihood that the resident IOU will oppose their efforts. They must expect
IOU-supported public relations and education campaigns against
municipalization. These campaigns would likely emphasize the costs and
risks associated with municipalization, particularly those involved in: (1)
construction, purchase or condemnation of distribution facilities; (2) efforts
to obtain cheaper long-term wholesale power; (3) efforts to obtain wholesale
transmission access; and (4) paying wholesale wheeling rates that might
include a stranded cost obligation. For example, Aberdeen, New Jersey,
both the city of Aberdeen and the resident IOU, Jersey Central Power &
Light Co. performed feasibility studies of municipalization, and the IOU led

56. Interestingly, in St. Lawrence and Franklin Counties in New York, an international
project development company, called the Wing Group, is putting up all the costs of the
municipalization study, implementation and operation for a group of 21 towns in the area.
Assuming municipalization succeeds, Wing will recoup its costs with interest at the prime rate
as part of a bond issue. Jon Birger, UpstateNew York Utility May Get Competiton From Localities
It Served, THE BOND BuyER, Nov. 8,1996, at 2; Wing Eyes Upstate N.Y. Communitiesfor a New
Muni DepartingNIMO System, NORTHEAsrEN POWER RT., July 7,1995, at 1; N.Y. Muni Now
Includes 25 Communities; Bonding Referenda Expected in 2 Yars, Nomr
MN PowER RP., Dec.
6, 1996, at 5.
57. See 61 Fed. Reg. 21540, 21677 (1996), where FERC cites the benefits reported in the
Final Environmental Impact Statement prepared by its staff in connection with FERC Order No.
888 adopting rules to promote wholesale electric competition through open access nondiscriminatory transmission services by public utilities. Other non-quantitative benefits
reported include better use of existing assets and institutions, new market mechanisms,
technical innovation, and less rate distortion.
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a public relations campaign against it. The subsequent referendum on
municipalization was soundly defeated.s
It is also quite possible that the resident IOU will challenge the
municipality's authority to implement its municipalization plan in
appropriate state, federal agency and judicial forums.-" In the event the city
pursues condemnation, a heated disagreement will likely erupt over the
compensation due the IOU for property taken as well as property rendered
surplus by the municipalization.
CONCLUSION
Even though municipalization may be an expensive option to study
and implement, many cities are experiencing high enough electric rates that
they have an incentive to pursue it. Indeed, as retail wheeling reform
spreads across the country, it is likely that citizens in "unreformed" states
will exert even more pressure on their cities to municipalize, with the hope
that they too will soon have lower electric rates.

58. James A. Lanard and Glenn 0. Steiger, Saying "No" to Municipalization: JCP&L Case Sets
Grassroots Standard; Winning Mood and Politica Support Can Prove Crucial, For., Feb. 1,1996, at
29.
59. See, e.g., State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. City of Clyde, 76 Ohio St. 3d 508,668 N.E.2d
498 (1996); City of Palm Springs, California, 76 FERC para. 61,127 (1996).

